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The contrast could scarcely be bigger. Kant’s theory of law is a very bad book, writes 
Schopenhauer at the beginning of the 19
th
 century, a collection of mistakes hanging together. 
It must have been Kant’s old age! The book is indeed badly composed, writes Ludwig some 
30 years ago. It must have been due to the process that led from manuscript to printed book! 
Therefore Ludwig provided us with a new, not uncontested, edition of Kant’s theory of law, 
in which various parts of the text are presented in a different place.  
None of this is true, say Byrd and Hruschka at the beginning of the 21
th
 century. 
Kant’s ‘doctrine of right’, as it is now often called (I always hesitate when I find 
‘Rechtsphilosophie’ translated as ‘philosophy of right’; why not simply: philosophy of law, 
and thus here: doctrine of law?), is a highly structured and meticulously formulated 
masterpiece on legal and political philosophy. From a very limited number of assumptions 
Kant develops here, so we are told, in a Euclidean manner a complete system of individual 
rights. Subsequently, Kant indicates what these rights entail for the constitution of the legal 
order of the state, the order between states and for the cosmopolitan legal order. Nobody 
before or after Kant has drawn in a such a radical manner the consequences of what it means 
that human beings have the innate right of freedom to own external objects as their property. 
While it must be admitted that Kant did not make life easy for his readers, it must also be 
presumed that he was primarily interested in ‘getting the theory right’, not in presenting his 
theory in an easily accessible manner. 
Herewith the first assumption of this commentary is presented: Kant got it right in his 
doctrine of right, according to Byrd and Hruschka; where Kant’s text seems impenetrable or 
confused, the problem lies not with Kant but with the reader who should feel encouraged to 
try harder to understand him. Therefore, the doctrine of right should not be criticised as 
inconsistent or contradictory but interpreted in such a manner that it comes out as a unique, 
complete and logically consistent whole. The second assumption of this commentary is that 
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Kant’s earlier texts in legal and political philosophy, such as ‘On the common saying’ and 
‘Towards perpetual peace’ are of limited use for interpreting Kant’s system of legal 
philosophy as developed in the doctrine of right. In comparison with these earlier texts, Kant 
has not only drastically extended his position by adding a treatise on private law but has also 
drastically changed his position, most notably with regard to war and peace. Thirdly, 
according to this commentary, the influence of Achenwall on Kant’s mature philosophy of 
law, both with regard to substance and to formulations, is of such importance that the 
difficulties with Kant’s text can only be solved with the help of Achenwall’s works. The final 
assumption follows from this: Kant’s text should be understood within the context of his 
contemporaries, most notably Achenwall, and thus references to much of the contemporary 
literature on Kant’s doctrine of right is neither needed nor very helpful. Kant was familiar 
with much of his contemporary literature and therefore that body of texts helps us understand 
his texts. 
The result of this approach is, in one word, stunning. Following the introduction of 
these assumptions, one finds a highly structured book in which Kant’s doctrine of right is 
reconstructed on the basis of an extensive analysis of Paragraph 41. In this crucial Paragraph, 
Kant not only sketches the transition of private law to public law, but also introduces the three 
so-called leges (lex iusti, lex iuridica and lex iustititae) which are then subsequently 
connected to the three essential institutions of the Kantian state: the legislative power, the 
market and the juridical power. The book subsequently discusses, respectively, the opposition 
between the state of nature and the juridical state; the right to freedom; the juridical postulate 
of practical reason on the basis of which property is possible; the distinct forms of property 
that Kant distinguishes; the state and the international and cosmopolitan order. The authors do 
not shy away from well-known textual difficulties, such as the meaning of the many adages 
stemming from Roman law that Kant uses, among which the already mentioned ‘leges’ and 
the three rules of Ulpian. They also discuss e.g. Kant’s statements that the criminal law is a 
categorical imperative and that ought implies can.  
This all leads to the picture of a Kantian state as a minimal state, the sole aim of which 
is to protect and secure the natural rights of human beings and (thus) to guarantee the 
functioning of the market in which humans are fully free to buy and sell their property: 
volenti non fit iniuria! The state is prohibited from interfering within the sphere of private 
relations between citizens since these relationships should develop autonomously on the basis 
of the freedom of contract. Since Kant rejects any form of paternalistic government and 
rejects Cicero’s dictum that public well-being is the first law of the state, this commentary 
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concludes that the welfare state is incompatible with Kant’s principles. The free market 
interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of right is not restricted to the state alone, but leads to an 
interpretation of Kant’s cosmopolitan legal order as a plea for facilitating and securing 
international commercial trade. 
This commentary is very useful for those who are already (somewhat) familiar with 
Kant’s doctrine of right and who are prepared to read Kant’s text anew alongside this 
commentary. This book is certainly not an easy introduction. As I belong to the first category 
of readers (at least, so I think), this commentary was at times very illuminating. Nevertheless, 
I also often disagree, for a variety of reasons, with the interpretations that Byrd and Hruschka 
present in an often quite apodictic manner. Let me summarize a few of my hesitations. First 
with regard to the relationship between Kant’s earlier texts and the doctrine of right:  How 
likely is the assumption that Kant fundamentally changed his views on the state and in 
particular on the international legal order between 1792 and 1795 on the one hand and 1797 
on the other? Take the following example: in the doctrine of right Kant acknowledges, 
according to Byrd and Hruschka, the right to wage war as the permitted way for a state to 
assert its rights. This is ‘the opposite to his position in Perpetual Peace’. I argue (in: Kant and 
the Just War Tradition, in: H.G. Justenhoven, W.A. Barbieri Jr. (eds.), From Just War to 
Modern Peace Ethics, De Gruyter Berlin 2012, 231-247) that Kant’s remarks to this effect in 
the doctrine of right should be understood not as a prescription, but as a description of the 
state of nature between states. In other words, Kant does not acknowledge a ius ad bellum, 
which would not only make him into a ‘sorry comforter’ like all the other representatives of 
the just war tradition, but which would also destroy the prospect of a lasting peace. Nor is the 
portrait of Kant as a proto-libertarian entirely convincing. Whereas this commentary goes into 
great detail when commenting on certain passages of Kant’s text, it is telling that no attention 
at all is given to General Remark C of Paragraph 49, in which Kant discusses, as is well 
known, the socio-economic duties of the state to support organizations for the poor. It could 
be argued more generally that certain provisions with regard to the redistribution of property 
by the state can indeed not be justified on the basis of paternalism (which Kant rejects 
indeed), but that they can be justified on the basis of protecting civil independence, on the 
basis of which no one should be dependent upon the choice of someone else (to which Kant 
subscribes). 
There are quite a few other interpretations in this commentary with which one can take 
issue, but let me conclude with a general observation. Kant’s Die Metaphysik der Sitten is a 
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diptych in which one finds a doctrine of law alongside a doctrine of virtue. Yet we do not find 
in this commentary any reflection on the unity of Kant’s metaphysics of morals. Byrd and 
Hruschka suggest that the doctrine of right stands on its own and that it deals with individual 
rights and the implications of these rights only. Yet throughout the critical period, Kant 
consistently announced his intention to publish a ‘metaphysics of morals’ and, finally, at the 
end of his life, he published this book as one book in two parts. Writing and commenting on 
the first part of this book (with only a few comments on the doctrine of virtue) has far 
reaching implications. Think e.g. of the first of the Ulpian rules: ‘honeste vive’. This rule is 
indeed found in the doctrine of right and is interpreted by Byrd and Hruschka as emphasizing 
the fact that everyone is a person with individual rights. Yet, it would seem to me that the 
duty to live an honorable life cannot itself be a ‘right’. ‘Honeste vive’ seems primarily a duty, 
namely the duty someone has towards himself. Therefore it seems to fit badly within the 
doctrine of right. We know that Kant hesitated where to place the Ulpian rules: should they 
not fit better within the doctrine of virtue (see e.g.: A. Pinzani, Der systematische Stellenwert 
der pseudo-ulpianischen Regeln in Kants Rechtslehre, in: Zeitschrift fuer philosophische 
Forschung (59) 2005, 73-4)? And indeed, one can find the duty to lead an honourable life as a 
part of the doctrine of virtue as well. Such a reflection on Ulpian’s first rule as a duty to self, 
however, forces us to abandon the narrow perspective on Kant’s doctrine of right as a proto-
libertarian treatise and to approach Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals very different, namely as a 
rich and a rather classical work which takes its starting point in duties and then moves on to 
discuss not only rights, but virtues as well. 
 
 
